

# Nabeela N. Alam

Grinnell College  
Department of Economics  
1210 Park Street  
Grinnell, IA 50112

mobile: (617) 416-4006  
office: (641) 269-4566  
[nabeela.alam@grinnell.edu](mailto:nabeela.alam@grinnell.edu)  
[www.grinnell.edu/users/alamnabe](http://www.grinnell.edu/users/alamnabe)

## APPOINTMENTS

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2013 – present **Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA**

## EDUCATION

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### **Brandeis University – International Business School (IBS), Waltham, MA**

- 2012 Ph.D. in International Economics and Finance, GPA 3.73/4.00  
Dissertation title: Essays on Politics, Trade and Foreign Aid  
Dissertation Committee: Catherine Mann (Chair), Can Erbil, Kathryn Graddy, Nidhya Menon
- 2008 M.S. in International Economics and Finance

### **Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA**

- 2001 S.B. in Economics  
S.B. in Brain & Cognitive Sciences  
Concentration in Writing

## RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

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- Primary: Applied Microeconomics, Development, Behavioral & Experimental Economics, Political Economy  
Secondary: Industrial Organization, Applied Econometrics, International Trade

## GRANTS, AWARDS AND RESEARCH FUNDING

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- 2013 – 2014 Grinnell College, Committee on Support for Faculty Scholarship Grant for *UN voting alignment with US and export dependence on China*
- 2014 Grinnell College, Committee on Support for Faculty Scholarship Grant for *Gender Issues in Household Decision-Making*
- 2014 Grinnell College, John N. and Mary K. Shephard Faculty Travel and Study Fund for *Political Economy of International Organisations*
- 2014 Grinnell College, Center for International Studies Grant (competitive) for Course Embedded Travel to Dhaka, Bangladesh for upper-level course titled *Decision-Making Under Poverty*
- 2013 Grinnell College, Committee on Support for Faculty Scholarship Travel Grant for additional conference (competitive for second conference)
- 2004 – 2010 Brandeis University, IBS Teaching/Research Fellowship
- 2004 – 2008 Brandeis University, IBS Grant (competitive)
- 2003 – 2004 Brandeis University, Global Leadership Award (competitive)
- 1997 – 2001 MIT, Abdul Latif Jameel–Toyota Endowed Scholarship (full tuition)
- 1999 MIT, Robert A. Boit Writing Prize (Third place) in Short Story category

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**CONFERENCES AND INVITED SPEAKER PRESENTATIONS**


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- 2015 (scheduled) "Do Countries Balance Export Dependence on China by Politically Aligning with the US?" 8th Annual Conference on Political Economy of International Organizations, Berlin, Germany
- 2014 (declined) "Do Countries Balance Export Dependence on China by Politically Aligning with the US?" International Economic Association World Congress 2014, Dead Sea, Jordan
- 2014 Attendee, Using Behavioral Economics to Improve the Design of Microfinance Products, Microfinance Club of New York, New York City, NY
- 2014 "Do Countries Balance Export Dependence on China by Politically Aligning with the US?" Midwest Economic Association Conference, Evanston, IL
- 2014 "Do Countries Balance Export Dependence on China by Politically Aligning with the US?" Eastern Economic Association Conference, Boston, MA
- 2014 "Bilateral Trade Ties, Elections and Foreign Aid Allocation: A Comparison Across Donors" Eastern Economic Association Conference, Boston, MA
- 2014 (declined) "Do Political Parties Prefer Foreign Aid or Campaign Finance?" Australasian Trade Workshop, Perth, Australia
- 2013 "Do Countries Balance Export Dependence on China by Politically Aligning with the US?" Center for International Studies, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA
- 2013 "Bilateral Trade Ties, Elections and Foreign Aid Allocation," State University of New York at Oswego, NY
- 2013 "Bilateral Trade Ties, Elections and Foreign Aid Allocation," Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA
- 2013 "Bilateral Trade Ties, Elections and Foreign Aid Allocation," Siena College, Loudonville, NY
- 2012 "Bilateral Trade Ties, Elections and Foreign Aid Allocation," National Council on Compensation Insurance, Boca Raton, FL
- 2012 "Foreign Aid and Development," Manhattanville College, Manhattanville, NY
- 2012 "Trade, Elections and Foreign Aid," Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA
- 2010 "Elections, Electoral Competition and Foreign Aid," Babson College, Wellesley, MA
- 2010 "Foreign Aid and Development," Brandeis University IBS/Department of Economics, Waltham, MA
- 2010 "Elections, Electoral Competition and Foreign Aid," Brandeis University IBS/Department of Economics, Waltham, MA
- 2009 "Do Parties Prefer Foreign Aid or Campaign Finance?" Alexander Hamilton Center Graduate Conference on Political Economy, New York University, New York, NY

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**PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**


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- Referee: Review of International Organisations
- Discussant: 8th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, 2015 (scheduled)  
Eastern Economic Association, 2014  
Midwest Economic Association, 2014

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**PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**


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American Economic Association  
Eastern Economic Association  
Midwest Economic Association  
National Association of Business Economics  
Royal Economic Society  
US Bangladesh Advisory Council  
Microfinance Club of New York

## RESEARCH AND WORK EXPERIENCE

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- 2009 – 2010 Program Officer, US–Bangladesh Advisory Council, Washington, DC
- 2008 Summer Case Analyst, LECG, New York, NY
- 2005 – 2006 Short-Term Consultant to Prof Chad Bown: World Bank project on antidumping
- 2005 Research Assistant for Prof Nidhya Menon, Brandeis University Dept of Economics, Waltham, MA:  
*Occupational choice under uncertainty using household data from Nepal*
- 2004 Summer Intern, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines: *Foreign aid effectiveness*
- 2001 – 2003 Research Technologist, Daniel Haber Lab – Molecular Genetics, Massachusetts General Hospital  
Cancer Research Center, Charlestown, MA
- 2001 Undergrad Researcher for Prof Abhijit Banerjee, MIT Dept of Economics, Cambridge, MA
- 2000 Undergrad Researcher for Prof John de Figueiredo, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA
- 1998 – 2000 Undergrad Researcher for Prof William Quinn, MIT Center for Learning & Memory, Cambridge, MA

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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### Grinnell College – Primary Instructor, 2013 – present

- Microeconomic Analysis (undergraduate, 3 semesters + Spring 2015)
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics (undergraduate, 2 semesters)
- Introduction to Economics (undergraduate, 1 semester + Spring 2015)
- Introduction to Statistics (undergraduate, 1 semester)
- Decision-Making Under Poverty (undergraduate, Spring 2015 – includes **off-campus travel** to Dhaka, Bangladesh)

### Brandeis University – Primary Instructor, 2007 – 2011

- Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate, 5 semesters)
- Managerial Economics (MA/MBA, 3 semesters)
- Quantitative Reasoning (pre-college, 1 semester), *Brandeis Transitional Year Program* for minorities

### Babson College – Primary Instructor, 2010

- Principles of Macroeconomics (undergraduate, 1 semester)

### Brandeis University – Teaching Assistant, 2004 – 2010

- Advanced Microeconomics I (PhD) for Professor Blake LeBaron
- Advanced Microeconomics II – Game Theory (PhD) for Professor Kathryn Graddy
- Advanced Microeconomics II – Game Theory (PhD) for Dr. Dominique Lauga
- Economic Theory and Social Policy (PhD in Social Policy) for Professor Barry Friedman (2 semesters)
- International Trade Theory (PhD) for Professor Patricia Tovar
- Managerial Economics (MA/MBA in Social Policy and Management) for Professor Barry Friedman
- International Trade Policy (MA/MBA) for Professor Peter Petri
- Global Economic Environment (MA/MBA) for Professor Stephen Cecchetti
- Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate) for Professor Paroma Sanyal
- Game Theory (undergraduate) for Dr. Jeremy Dalletaze
- Experimental Economics (undergraduate) for Dr. Peter DeScioli

### Harvard University Summer School – Teaching Assistant, 2009

- Introduction to Econometrics and Statistics (undergraduate) for Professor Can Erbil and Dr. Daniela Kulusheva

## MENTORED STUDENT RESEARCH

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- Ian Sales, *Guilt and Shame in Dictator Games*, Grinnell IRB approved experiment, Spring 2014
- Chi Nguyen, *Economic Dependence on China and Voting in the ASEAN Bloc*, Spring 2015

## FACULTY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

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- 2013 – 2015 Faculty Development Seminar, Grinnell College
- 2014 Reading Group in Political Economy, Grinnell College
- 2013 International and Comparative Studies Working Group, Center for International Studies, Grinnell College

## INSTITUTIONAL SERVICE

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- 2014 – 2015 Term Faculty Liaison, Social Sciences Division, Grinnell College
- 2008 – 2009 Faculty–Student Coordinator, Department of Economics, Brandeis University

## SKILLS

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- Languages: Fluent in English and Bengali (native), conversant in French, Hindi and Urdu
- Computer: Stata, SAS, Matlab, Maple, C, C++, LaTeX
- Datasets: OECD International Development Statistics, WB Database of Political Institutions, WB World Development Indicators, COMTRADE, WITS, Global Antidumping Database, Global Insight, Nepal Longitudinal Household Survey

## REFERENCES

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Professor William Ferguson  
Grinnell College  
Department of Economics, Chair  
ferguso1@grinnell.edu  
641.269.3132

Professor Catherine Mann (Committee chair)  
Brandeis University, IBS/Department of Economics  
(currently on leave as)  
Chief Economist/Head of Economic Department, OECD  
clmann@brandeis.edu  
781.736.2233

Professor Can Erbil  
Boston College  
Department of Economics  
can.erbil@bc.edu, cerbil@brandeis.edu

Professor Kathryn Graddy  
Brandeis University  
Department of Economics  
kgraddy@brandeis.edu  
781.736.8616

Professor Barry Friedman  
Brandeis University  
Heller School of Social Policy and Management  
bfriedma@brandeis.edu  
781.736.3783

## PLANNED PUBLICATIONS

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### [Bilateral trade ties, elections and foreign aid allocation: A comparison across donors](#), *Job Market Paper*

This paper informs the aid effectiveness debate by examining non-development motives of bilateral foreign aid flows. Using a panel of five bilateral donors and a hundred recipient countries from 1975-2008, I find that trade ties, recipients' access to donor markets, elections and political competitiveness in the recipient country are associated with changes in foreign aid commitments. I show that the US gives more aid to its non-competitive, larger trade partners, but cuts their aid ahead of elections. It substitutes aid with market access for non-competitive countries for which it is an important export market, but not during election years. Germany, Japan and UK give more aid to countries with competitive electoral systems, but for these countries Japan and UK substitute aid with trade. The substitution disappears for UK during election years. Japan and UK also reward countries for which they are important export markets with more aid, but only during non-election years for Japan. During election

years, Germany cuts aid to non-competitive countries, but gives more aid to non-competitive countries for which it is an export destination. There is some evidence that France substitutes aid with market access for politically competitive countries.

### [UN voting alignment with US and export dependence on China](#)

This paper presents evidence that having China as a major export market is associated with that country's UN General Assembly voting alignment with the United States, and the relationship is mediated by whether the country exports oil and minerals. Using a panel of 100 developing and emerging market economies spanning 1995–2008, I find regional differences in the relationship between export dependence on China and UN voting alignment after controlling for US grant aid disbursements. In Latin America, higher export dependence is associated with lower voting alignment. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this is true for countries that do not rely on oil and mineral exports. Resource-exporting countries in Africa have a lower level of voting alignment with the US relative to other countries, but their voting alignment does not vary with higher export dependence on China.

### [Do parties facing electoral competition substitute away from foreign aid?](#)

This paper extends the Grossman and Helpman (1996) model of elections and special interests by including foreign aid in order to examine the government's incentives for accepting foreign aid in face of electoral competition. Rich and poor individuals vote in elections based on the government and opposition party's policy platforms. The rich group can forge political connections by making monetary contributions to political parties and thereby potentially countering conditional foreign aid. Similar to GH (1996) I find that the party with the higher probability of winning receives more contributions and is asked to deviate more from its preferred policy. In addition I find that parties deviate more from their preferred policy under unconditional foreign aid, but that this may no longer be true with conditional foreign aid. Moreover, if conditionality is high enough it may raise incentives for a contributing group to alter election probabilities in order to get that group's policy endorsement implemented.

**Why is foreign assistance more effective in some countries? An enquiry into factors contributing to aid effectiveness**, Asian Development Bank, 2004

## **RESEARCH IN PROGRESS**

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### **Gender preference in household expenditures**

Gender bias in household spending between boys and girls is a widely known phenomenon. I try to explain this fact by using a two period model of household bargaining where parents rely on their children for second period consumption and choose spending levels on children in the first period according to their future earning potential.

### **The right (time) to secede: Why nationalist parties demand a referendum for independence when they do** (with Gemma Sala)

Many national minority parties demand independence; others pursue political autonomy instead. Most explanations for secessionism in Western democracies focus on regional economic interests and identities, or the failure to accommodate national diversity through decentralization. This paper argues that independence referenda take place due to the strategic calculations of the main nationalist party given the political competition they face, and in particular when 1) more than one nationalist formation exists, 2) the main nationalist party is in government, and 3) it is electorally threatened. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that nationalist parties call a referendum for independence not to gain more power, but because they are afraid to lose it.

### **UN voting alignment with US when votes are contentious**

### **Marriage markets and determinants of dowry in South Asia**